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Abstract. In the present article, I show that sounds are properties that are not physical in a 
narrow sense. First, I argue that sounds are properties using Moorean style arguments and 
defend this property view from various arguments against it that make use of salient 
disanalogies between sounds and colors. The first disanalogy is that we talk of objects 
making sounds but not of objects making colors. The second is that we count and quantify 
over sounds but not colors. The third is that sounds can survive qualitative change in their 
auditory properties, but colors cannot survive change in their chromatic properties. Next, I 
provide a taxonomy of property views of sound. As the property view of sound has been so 
rarely discussed, many of the views available have never been articulated. My taxonomy will 
articulate these views and how they are related to one another. I taxonomize sounds 
according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, relational/non-relational, 
and reductive/non-reductive. Finally, mirroring a popular argument in the color literature, I 
argue that physical views in the narrow sense are unable to accommodate the similarity and 
difference relations in which sounds essentially stand. I end replying to three objections. 
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1  Introduction 
Views on what sounds are can be divided into two categories: property views and non-
property views. The property view is classically and most notably endorsed by John Locke 
who held that sounds are secondary qualities like colors, smells, and tastes. A version of the 
non-property view is popular in the natural sciences, namely the view that sounds are waves 
(vibrations transmitted by an elastic medium). Waves seem to be objects, events, or 
something we might call ‘disturbances.’ The natural sciences tend to prefer non-property 
views. For example, a popular view on color in the natural sciences is that colors are waves 
of light. Philosophers have departed from the natural sciences when it comes to the non-
property theory of color. The non-property view is so unpopular that taxonomies of 
philosophical views on color do not even mention views such as the wave theory (Cohen 
2009; Brogaard 2010; Roberts 2014).2 The problem with the wave theory of color is that it 
commits us to massive unexplained perceptual error. If colors were light waves, the stable red 
that we perceive tomatoes as having would really be something that is all around us and, in 
fact, even in our eyes.3 
 Aristotle, Galileo, and Descartes could all perhaps be interpreted as endorsing 
something like a wave theory of sound, but modern era philosophers have largely abandoned 
the view. The reason is that it, like the wave theory of color, commits us to massive 
unexplained perceptual error. Pasnau (1999) points out that we hear sounds as having 
relatively specific locations, and that those locations correspond to the objects that produce 
the sounds.4 However, sound waves do not have similarly specific locations. When an object 
is making a noise, the sound waves produced are all around us. So, if sounds are sound 
																																																								2Perhaps there is room for a halfway plausible event view of color (Pasnau 2009), but further discussion of 
views on color is outside the scope of this paper on the property view of sound. 	3Perhaps this unintuitive consequence could be outweighed by other considerations in favor of the wave view. I 
am not trying to argue against the wave view of color but trying to explain why it is so unpopular in philosophy.	4There is disagreement. Nudds (2009) holds that we do not hear sounds to be anywhere.  
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waves, our ears are constantly deceived about the locations of sounds. It would be the case 
that we perceive sounds as having relatively specific locations when they are, in fact, all 
around us, even in our ears. Pasnau’s arguments have had a strong impact on philosophers. 
The fact that sounds seem to have relatively specific locations is now taken very seriously in 
philosophy (as it has been for a while in psychophysics, Blauert 1997).   
 However, unlike color, where the property view is philosophical cannon, in the recent 
literature on sound, a non-property, event view is the most often defended type of view. This 
is because of various apparent disanalogies between sounds and colors. For example, it is 
said that we count and quantify over sounds like we would particulars but not colors (e.g. that 
there were three chimes before noon). Some take this to support the view that sounds are 
events created by objects. Casati and Dokic (1994) propose an event theory that sounds are 
events in the resonate object. More recently, O'Callaghan (2007) has defended a relational 
event theory that sounds are relational events that involve both the object and the nearby 
medium. Specifically, the view is that sounds are events of interacting bodies disturbing a 
nearby medium and setting it into motion.  
Philosophers have mainly been concerned with color. So, the concentration on non-
property views in the recent sound literature has resulted in basically no fresh attention being 
given to the Lockean view that sounds are properties. In this article, I want to turn up the 
volume, so to speak, on the property view of sound. I will first argue that sounds are 
properties and defend this from the various arguments against it that make use of salient 
disanalogies between sounds and colors (Section 2). Next, I will provide a taxonomy of 
property views on sound. As so little recent work has been done on the property view, few of 
the views available have ever been articulated. My taxonomy will articulate these views and 
how they are related to one another (Section 3). Finally, I shall argue that physical views in 
the narrow sense are unable to accommodate the similarity and difference relations in which 
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the sounds essentially stand (Section 4). Thus, in this article, I show that sounds are 
properties that are not physical in a narrow sense.  
 
2  Sounds are properties  
In this section, I argue that sounds are properties and defend this view from various 
arguments against it. Jonathan Schaffer (2009) is an ontological permissivist, because he 
thinks that it is trivial that numbers exist, that properties exist, that mereological composites 
exist, and so on. He thinks this because he believes that one can show these things exist via 
trivial arguments based on Moorean facts. Schaffer argues that numbers exist like so: there 
are prime numbers; therefore, there are numbers (2009, 357). He argues that composites exist 
like so: my body has proper parts, for example, my hands; therefore, there are things with 
proper parts (2009, 358). I think that one can produce some powerful arguments that sounds 
are properties based on Moorean facts too. Here is one. 
1. Some plane is roaring. 
2. Therefore, sounds are properties. 
Here is another. 
3. Some fly is buzzing. 
4. Therefore, sounds are properties. 
And another. 
5. Some watch is ticking. 
6. Therefore, sounds are properties. 
  
 Premises 1, 3, and 5 are Moorean facts. 2, 4, and 6 follow, respectively. A property is 
a way something is, in this case, roaring, buzzing, and ticking, and it cannot be that some 
sounds are properties and some are not. Whichever ontological categories a perceptible 
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property is in (e.g. a sound property), all perceptible properties of that kind are in those 
categories, necessarily. This is a prime presupposition in most of the relevant literature on 
perceptible properties. For example, it is assumed that colors are relational or not, properties 
or not, real or not, and this goes for sounds and tastes as well. Regardless, the entire debate 
between property theorists and non-property theorists of sound presupposes that (at least 
something like) the prime presupposition holds for sound: if it did not, the debate would be 
based on a false premise. So, it (or something like it) is an acceptable presupposition. 
Assuming the prime presupposition holds (or at least something like it), it follows from 1, 3, 
and 5 that sounds are properties.  
Even if the prime presupposition were false, premises 1, 3, and 5 would still pose a 
problem for the non-property view. As there are many true statements for different sounds 
which take the form of 1, 3, and 5 (e.g. some alarm is beeping, some dog is barking, some cat 
is meowing), there is an abductive case to be made for the following claim: for any sound S, 
there is some x such that x is S-ing, or at least would if in the right situation. To get from this 
to the conclusion that sounds are properties does not require the prime presupposition 
mentioned, but a weaker one to the effect that every perceptible property has its ontological 
categories necessarily.5 There is an obvious argument for this claim: something’s ontological 
categories are determined by its identity, and identity is necessary. A corollary is that there 
can be no change in an ontological category without a change in identity.  
If 1, 3, and 5 are true, then the non-property view is in serious trouble. So, one might 
attempt to argue against the property view of sound, by attempting a paraphrase of 1, 3, and 
5. For example, one might attempt to say that ‘some plane is roaring’ is short for ‘some plane 
is currently making roaring sounds.’ I will not attempt to anticipate and respond to every 
possible paraphrase. Rather, I offer a general response in line with the Moorean style of 
																																																								5	I am of course assuming, as is intuitive, that if S-ing is a property than S is.  
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argument I am using and similar to those Schaffer gives in reply to a similar style of 
criticism: the premises 1, 3, and 5 (and others like them) are obviously true as stated; one 
cannot deny that some plane is roaring, that some fly is buzzing, that some watch is ticking, 
and so on, because these claims are more certain than any claim to the contrary. Not everyone 
will find Moorean-style arguments satisfying. However, they have a respected history in 
philosophy, and they are available to support the property view of sound.6 
 My opponent may be worried about certain purported disanalogies between sounds 
and colors (Casati and Dokic 1994; O’Callaghan 2007, 2008). I shall look at these purported 
disanalogies and show that none constitute a reason to reject the property view. The first 
disanalogy I will examine is that we talk of objects making sounds but not of objects making 
colors. The second disanalogy I will investigate is that we count and quantify over sounds but 
not colors. The third disanalogy I will look at is that sounds can survive qualitative change in 
their auditory properties but colors cannot survive change in their chromatic properties. My 
responses depend on the following strange color world: 
Imagine a world in which all objects were (mostly) transparent but when caused to 
vibrate suddenly became colored and would exemplify one color after another for 
some time before again becoming transparent. The exact colors objects would 
exemplify would depend on the type of object and how much it vibrated. For 
example, dense objects would exemplify different determinable colors on average 
than less dense objects, and objects would exemplify different determinate colors of 
the density-determined determinable color dependent on how much they were 
vibrating. If a very dense object were caused to slightly vibrate it would become light 
red, then a lighter red, then lighter, then white, and then the white would fade and the 
																																																								6Of course, stepping back, it must be admitted that further engagement with what people mean by sound 
attributions is relevant. Ultimately, what people mean seems at least partially empirical.	
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object would again be transparent, and if the object were caused to vibrate a lot, it 
would suddenly become a very dark red, and then a lighter and lighter red until it 
became white before fading back to being transparent. If a less dense object were 
caused to vibrate lightly it would become a light blue, then a lighter blue, then lighter, 
and then white before  fading back to being transparent, and if the object were caused 
to vibrate more heavily it would become a dark blue, and then a lighter blue, and 
lighter, then white, and again the whiteness would fade to transparency.  
  
The first disanalogy, as I said, is that, unlike colors, we talk of objects making sounds. In 
reply, consider the strange color world. In this world, intuitively, we would speak of objects 
as ‘making’ colors. We would say things like ‘steel makes a very dark red color’ and things 
like ‘if you hit steel hard enough it will make a red so dark it looks black.’ Colors would be 
properties in this world, as they are properties in the actual world. Colors in this strange color 
world are similar in the relevant ways to sounds in the actual world. Hence, we should not 
think that the mentioned disanalogy shows that sounds are not properties. (Colors being 
properties in the actual world is almost universally accepted in the literature. Thus, I will not 
argue in-depth for this claim; it is an assumption on which my arguments are based. All 
arguments require assumptions. Regardless, clearly the Moorean arguments provided for the 
property view of sound could be applied mutatis mutandis for color.) 
One might question my claim that intuitively we would speak of objects ‘making’ 
colors in the strange color world. Here is why I endorse the claim: we use the word ‘make’ to 
convey causal production. In the actual world, objects’ causal production of colors occurs at 
the atomic level and so cannot be noticed with simply our senses (science suggests that colors 
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are caused by the atomic-workings of objects).7 Thus, the causal production of colors is not 
salient to us in the actual world, and it seems that for this reason we do not, in the actual 
world, talk of objects ‘making’ colors. If the causal production of a property is not salient to 
us, we are unlikely to speak of its causal production in typical conversation. In the world 
described, however, an important part of the causal production of colors can be noticed using 
simply our senses. Thus, in this strange color world, it seems, because of the salience of the 
causal production of colors in it, we would talk of objects ‘making’ colors. A corollary is that 
our ‘making’ talk with regard to sounds but not colors in the actual world can be explained by 
an important part of the causal production of sounds but not colors being noticeable 
perceptually (e.g. objects’ vibrating when hit). Another corollary is that objects can make 
sounds and have sounds too, just as is the case with colors: an object’s color is caused and so 
is made (in the relevant sense) by various physical phenomena but colors are properties.  
The second disanalogy is that, unlike with colors, we count and quantify over sounds. 
We say, for instance, that there were three chimes before noon. Cohen (2010) points out that 
we do count colors just not through time in the way we do sounds. He goes on to make the 
lucid point that the disparity in how we talk about sounds and colors may be due to our 
perceptual systems being more sensitive to the spatial rather than temporal locations of colors 
and the temporal rather than spatial locations of sounds. I wish to make a separate point: the 
disanalogy is anodyne. Consider the strange color world. In it we would count and quantify 
over colors and do so through time. It would be natural to say that the object was first a deep 
red and second a lighter red, and third a lighter red, and fourth that it became white, and then 
fifth that its whiteness faded away and that the object was again transparent. Hence, we could 
naturally ask the question, ‘how many colors did the object have?’ and respond like so: ‘it 																																																								7One might reject the causal view that the colors of objects bear a causal relation to objects’ atomic-workings, 
but this view at least seems true in the strange color world. So, it seems that the causal view is not necessarily 
false. This said, whether one agrees with the causal view probably depends on what one thinks colors are and on 
what one thinks causation is. So, further discussion is really outside the scope of this article.     
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had three different reds and then a white.’ Colors would be properties in this world, as they 
are properties in the actual world. Colors in this strange color world are similar in the relevant 
ways to sounds in the actual world: we would count and quantify over them and do so 
through time. Hence, we should not think that the disanalogy shows anything about the 
ontology of sounds.  
 The third disanalogy is that sounds, unlike colors, can survive qualitative change in 
their auditory properties (pitch, timbre, and loudness). This disanalogy, in my opinion, like 
the others, does not show much. Cohen (2010) differentiates between the view that sounds 
survive qualitative change and the view that sounds do not survive qualitative change, what 
he calls ‘survivalism’ and ‘non-survivalism.’ Cohen thinks that what is known about the 
neutrally described facts about sound is agnostic between these two views. I do not disagree 
with this response, but there is, I think, a better way to defend the property view of sounds. 
My explanation relies on the intuitive idea that there are composite sounds, for example, a 
whirling siren, and non-composite sounds, the discrete sounds that make up the siren, as 
defined by the three phenomenal auditory dimensions: pitch, timbre, and loudness.8   
 A whirling siren sound can survive being composed of different sounds at different 
times, because that is the kind of entity it is. However, are colors more accurately compared 
to discrete sounds or to composite sounds? Upon reflection, the answer is that colors are 
more accurately compared to discrete sounds: colors and discrete sounds are both defined by 
three dimensions but composite sounds are not. Can discrete sounds unlike colors survive 
qualitative change? No, a discrete sound is defined by its pitch, timbre, and loudness just like 
a color is defined by its hue, saturation, and lightness. So, a discrete sound in a siren, for 
instance, would not be the sound it is if it were qualitatively any different from how it is. By 
																																																								8	If being a composite sound or a discrete sound are ontological categories, then this is an exception to the prime 
presupposition mentioned at the beginning of the section, but it is not an exception relevant to my arguments.			
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definition, if the pitch, timbre, or loudness of a discrete sound were changed, the discrete 
sound would cease to be the sound it is. Thus, the best response to the third disanalogy 
between sound and color is to say that the proper analogy is between colors and discrete 
sounds in particular and that neither can survive qualitative change.  
 What about composite sounds? What we should say here is similar to what I have said 
in response to the other worries. Consider the strange color world. This is a world in which it 
would be natural to sometimes talk about something we would likely call ‘a color’ that would 
be composed of different colors (red, green, blue…) at different times. We would sometimes 
want to differentiate between objects based on the colors they ‘make,’ and the colors they 
‘make’ would change through time depending on various factors (e.g. density in the world 
described). Objects that when normally encountered were vibrating, a whirling siren, would 
have composite colors unique to them. Hence, we would want to compare such objects based 
on their composite colors. We would say things like ‘the US police siren is c-red [a 
composite color; doesn’t matter what it looks like for this abstract example] but the UK 
police siren is c-yellow [another composite color].’ Composite colors are properties in this 
described world, because they are ways that objects are (c-red, c-yellow…). Therefore, by 
analogy, we have no reason to believe that composite sounds are not properties in the actual 
world. In fact, it is hard to believe we ever had a reason, because it is a Moorean fact that 
some siren is (or soon will be) whirling (a composite sound).  
 
3  A taxonomy of property views of sound 
As the property view of sound has been so infrequently discussed, the many views available 
have never been articulated in any detail. I can distinguish between eleven respectable 
candidate views for what properties sounds are. I am here focusing on discrete sounds not 
composite sounds. An understanding of the former allows for an understanding of the latter, 
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because composite sounds are composed of discrete sounds. I choose to group these eleven 
property views on (discrete) sound as follows: 
Dispositional Relational Reductive Views on what sounds are 
No No No Non-relational primitivism  
 
No No Yes Vibrationism, Disjunctive vibrationism, Disjunctive  
wave/vibration dispositionalism, ??? 
 
No Yes No Primitive appearance relationalism, ???  
 
No Yes Yes Reductive appearance relationalism, Vibration 
relationalism, ??? 
 
Yes No No Not available 
 
Yes No Yes Appearance sound dispositionalism, wave 
dispositionalism, vibration dispositionalism, ??? 
Yes Yes No Not available 
 
Yes Yes Yes ??? 
 
   The question marks illustrate the logical space for unthought-of of views.   
 
 
According to this taxonomy, property views of sound are grouped according to three 
characteristics: dispositional/non-dispositional, relational/non-relational, and reductive/non-
reductive. This taxonomy is flexible. Additional characteristics can be added as needed. (To 
suit my purposes in Section 4, I simply add to this taxonomy the characteristic of being 
physical in a narrow sense.) A property P is dispositional =df for some manifestation M and 
circumstances C, P is identical with the disposition to M in C. Dispositional properties 
connect objects with counterfactuals in a special way that non-dispositional properties (also 
called ‘categorical properties’) do not.9 So, if sounds are dispositions, one must hold that they 
give objects a special connection with counterfactuals. It is natural for the sound 
																																																								9The simple conditional analysis (SCA) of dispositions is unpopular, thus it is unclear how exactly dispositions 
are related to counterfactuals. See Johnston (1992), Bird (1998), and Martin (2008) for arguments against the 
SCA. With this being said, even though the SCA is unpopular, most everyone agrees that there is some 
connection between dispositional properties and counterfactuals.  	
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categoricalist to understand sounds similarly to shapes, and say that what it is to have a sound 
is to have a certain structure. To have a certain structure is to have a property that varies over 
certain dimensions, for example, shape varies over width, length, height, and internal angles. 
A categorical reductivist, for instance, would point to a vibrational structure described 
mathematically. Vibrationism and disjunctive vibrationism both understand sounds in this 
way. Vibrationism is the view that sounds are properties of vibrating in such and such ways. 
A categorical non-reductivist (also called a ‘primitivist’) would point to the phenomenal 
structure of auditory space by referring to the dimensions which describe this space: pitch, 
timbre, and loudness. 
Vibration dispositionalism is the view that sounds are dispositions to vibrate if certain 
generally specified conditions are met. Kulvicki’s (2008) view is one of this kind. He holds 
that sounds are dispositions to vibrate if ‘thwacked.’ A related view is wave dispositionalism. 
This is the view that sounds are dispositions to produce sound waves if certain generally 
specified conditions are met. Wave dispositionalism is similar to the vibration dispositionalist 
view but does have distinct consequences. The wave view is compatible with an object 
having a sound that does not vibrate. This may be an advantage of the view. Imagine a highly 
advanced jet engine that does not itself vibrate but sounds very loud because of the air 
disturbances it makes. One might think it is intuitive that the jet engine has a sound even 
though it does not itself vibrate. Regardless, the wave view has distinct consequences from 
the vibration view and so is a distinct theory. Both vibration and wave dispositionalism come 
in disjunctive varieties. Although the disjuncts are dispositions, the disjunctive properties 
themselves are not (they do not meet the definition given). Thus, these views are best 
classified as non-dispositional alongside vibrationism and disjunctive vibrationism.  
Appearance (sound) dispositionalism is the view that sounds are dispositions to 
auditorily appear certain ways (e.g. to be C minor on a piano, to be B flat, etc.) if certain 
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generally specified conditions are met. Mirroring the literature on the ontology of color, 
appearance dispositionalism can be divided into internal and external variants. Internal 
(sound) dispositionalism is a view of the same type as contemporary dispositionalism about 
color. Specifically, it is the view that sounds are dispositions to cause auditory experiences in 
us if certain generally specified conditions are met (e.g. if heard by normal observers in 
normal circumstances). External (sound) dispositionalism is a view of the same type as Noë’s 
(2004) ecological color dispositionalism. Namely, it is the view that sounds are dispositions 
to modify auditory appearances as the relevant conditions change, where auditory 
appearances are properties of external objects in addition to (and separate from) sounds.  
One may prefer external dispositionalism to internal dispositionalism because of 
considerations that mirror the debate in the color literature having to do with changing 
appearances in normal conditions (Kalderon 2008). An intuitive version of internal 
dispositionalism would hold that loudness is the disposition to auditorily appear loud to 
normal observers in normal conditions. There is at least some degree of sound constancy. For 
example, as one walks away from a jackhammer there is a sense in which it auditorily 
appears to get quieter and quieter even though there is another in which it appears just as loud 
(a sense in which the loudness is constant). Such constancy phenomena are ubiquitous with 
colors and shapes: a circle looks oval in some sense when viewed at a 45-degree angle while 
remaining circular in appearance in some other sense. To what degree constancy phenomena 
occur with sounds is unclear, but is seems reasonable to hold they are widespread.  
 The intuitive variant of internal (sound) dispositionalism may seem ill equipped to 
explain such constancy phenomena because it holds, for example, that a certain beep is the 
disposition to auditorily appear to have that specific beep in or throughout normal conditions. 
The problem is that if constancy phenomena are widespread for sound how things appear in 
normal conditions is seldom that simple. The jet plane would auditorily appear to be making 
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a single sound throughout normal conditions in one sense but would in another sense appear 
to be making different sounds as it approached, passed, and flew away. External 
dispositionalism may seem to have the tools to better explain such constancy phenomenon. 
The external dispositionalist distinguishes between two properties of objects: apparent sounds 
and sounds. Using this distinction, the external dispositionalist would say that what is going 
on regarding constancy is that the plane, for example, has a sound and an apparent sound, and 
that the former property remains constant and the latter changes.10  
 A reason to be suspicious of external dispositionalism is that it is intuitive that sounds 
are the only properties of external objects represented by auditory experiences as of things 
having sounds. One might say that this is analytic: experiences as of sounds are experiences 
as of sounds and nothing else. Hacker (1991) would seem to agree: he would say that 
experiences are differentiated by their objects, so sound experiences have as their objects 
sounds, color experiences, colors... Further, rejecting the intuitive assumption requires that 
the external dispositionalist provide additional insight into what exactly apparent sounds are 
supposed to be, because one might think they are mysterious properties. Apparent sounds 
cannot be C minor on a piano, B flat, etc., because these are sounds. Thus, what are apparent 
sounds supposed to be exactly? It seems they have to be like sounds phenomenally while 
neither being sounds nor experiences as of sounds, and this is quite odd. Of course, it is 
possible that these worries can be put to rest. They are obvious concerns though.  
A view on a type of property P (e.g. sound properties) is relational iff it says that the 
tokens of this type (sounds) are relational properties. There are positive and impure relational 
properties (Khamara 1988; Humberstone 1996). Being married is an example of the former 
and is biconditionally dependent on the relation ‘married to’ such that a person x is married 
																																																								10	Correction notice:	In the original online publication, the former/latter distinction was incorrectly reversed in 
this sentence thus suggesting that apparent colors remain constant.  
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iff x is married to someone. Being married to Tom is an example of the latter and is such that 
a person x has the property iff there is an individual Tom and x is married to him. Both of 
these types of relational property fit this analysis (Roberts 2014, 1803): 
Relational property analysis: A property P is relational iff there is some relation R 
such that it is essential to P that for all x, if x has P at time t, then for some thing(s) 
y1…yn, Rxy1…yn at t. (‘Essential’ here and elsewhere does not mean ‘necessary’ but 
something stronger. It is necessary to Socrates that he is in the singleton set 
containing Socrates but it is not essential to him, Kit Fine 1994.) 
 
Dispositions are not ipso facto relational properties. Dispositional properties like the 
disposition to cause experiences as of loudness in normal observers in normal conditions (if 
caused to vibrate in the right ways) are not relational properties. It is not essential to an object 
being so disposed that it bears a relation to anything. An object can have the relevant 
disposition even in a world in which it is the only thing that exists. (I argue for an analogous 
claim in-depth in Roberts 2014, Section 3 and so will not do so again here.) The same goes 
mutatis mutandis for wave and vibration dispositions. Unlike these dispositional properties, it 
is clearly essential to something having the relational property being west of New York, for 
example, that it bears the relation ‘west of’ to something, namely New York. So, west of 
New York is a relational property whereas appearance, wave, and vibration dispositions are 
not. Further, there can be relational properties that are not dispositional. For instance, spatial 
relational properties like being west of London are clearly not dispositional properties. So, 
there can be relational views on sound that are also categorical.11 
																																																								11So, arguments for dispositional monism (Mumford 2004; Bird 2005, 2007) may apply to certain relationalist 
sound views, while arguments for categorical monism (Armstrong 1997) need not rule out sound relationalism.	
	 	 Turning	up	the	volume	 16	
The reductivist says that what sounds are is given by a description (e.g. sounds are 
dispositions to give rise to auditory experiences if heard by normal observers in normal 
conditions, or sounds are vibrational structures described mathematically), while the non-
reductivist or primitivist denies this. The primitivist holds that what sounds are is given by 
our auditory phenomenal experiences and not by a description, so that what sounds are is just 
how they sound. In other words, the primitivist holds that the intrinsic natures of sounds are 
the phenomenal sounds or the sounds as we hear them. Phenomenal sounds are defined 
ostensively just as phenomenal colors are, by pointing. Hence, sound primitivism holds that 
the answer to ‘what are sounds?’ is given by pointing to sounds: that is a beep; that is C 
minor. No more fundamental answer to what are sounds is available according to the 
primitivist. The reductivist, on the other hand, holds that this is not the case: the intrinsic 
natures of sounds are not given phenomenally but by a description, for example, sounds are 
dispositions to vibrate when thwacked. Primitivism is incompatible with sounds being 
dispositions, vibration properties, types of vibration properties, types of wave dispositions, 
and so on, because the identities of these properties are given by descriptions, not 
phenomenally.  
Relationalism comes in primitivist and non-primitivist varieties. It may seem that 
primitivism is incompatible with relationalism, but this is false. To understand why, I must 
explain an important distinction between the intrinsic nature of a property and an essential 
property of that property. The property of being a triangle essentially has the property of 
being more similar to being rectangular than to being pentagonal, but the intrinsic nature of 
the property of being a triangle is not that it is the property of being more similar to being 
rectangular than to being pentagonal. The intrinsic nature of the property of being a triangle 
is that it is the geometric property of being a three-sided figure. Using this distinction, the 
primitivist can hold that sounds fit the relational property analysis. The intrinsic nature of 
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being C minor is that it is like that (pointing to a C minor sample), but that property has as an 
essential property being such that it is essential to it that for all x, if x has it, then for some 
thing(s) y1…yn, Rxy1…yn. In other words, primitivism is compatible with sounds being 
relational properties, because we can understand this not as saying what the intrinsic natures 
of sounds are but as merely giving an essential property of sounds. For these reasons, a 
corollary is that sound primitivism is compatible with both positive and impure relationalism.  
A plausible non-primitivist relational view is vibration relationalism: sounds are 
properties of vibrating in a medium (or in a certain kind of medium). The argument from 
vacuums that it is intuitive that things do not have sounds in a vacuum could motivate this 
view (Berkeley 2007). The relational event theory of sound (O'Callaghan 2007) is the non-
property cousin of the vibration relational view. Further relational views can be borrowed 
from the color literature. Mirroring Cohen’s relationalism (2004, 2009, 8-12, 24-36), one can 
create appearance sound relationalism: it is essential to any sound L that there is a relation R 
such that for any object x, x is sound L iff there exists an observer y (which need not be the 
same for different x’s) such that x bears R to y. This view can come in primitivist or 
reductivist variants, depending on what one takes the intrinsic natures of sounds to be.12 
Appearance relationalism must state the conditions under which R holds of <x, y> as 
involving subjects’ appearances, experiences, or something similar. (If the conditions are 
stated counterfactually, a case could perhaps be made for such an instance of appearance 
relationalism also being a dispositional view, but I will fall short of endorsing such a 
categorization.) Appearance relationalism can be tailored to accommodate auditory 
disagreement without misrepresentation thus avoiding the epistemic worries associated with, 
																																																								12Cohen (2009, 10, footnote 16) says that his view is reductive. However, given my explanation for how 
relational views can be primitive, we can see that it need not necessarily be reductive. 		
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for example, vibrationism of saying who is right in cases where normal observers disagree in 
normal conditions. To some, though, appearance relationalism will seem too subjective.  
So far, I have argued that sounds are properties (Section 2) and presented a taxonomy 
of property views of sound (Section 3). My arguments that sounds are properties are based on 
Moorean facts, for example, one such argument went like so: some watch is ticking; 
therefore, sounds are properties. The arguments presuppose the almost universally accepted 
presupposition that whichever ontological categories a perceptible property is in, all 
perceptible properties of that kind are in those categories, necessarily. For instance, it is 
assumed that all colors are relational or not, properties or not, real or not, and this goes for 
sounds too. I also examined three purported disanalogies between sounds and colors and 
showed that none pose a problem for the property view of sound. My taxonomy of property 
views of sound grouped such views according to three characteristics: dispositional/non-
dispositional, relational/non-relational, and reductive/non-reductive. I defined each of these 
characteristics, and presented various views on sound, some of which had yet to be 
mentioned in the literature. I pointed out that dispositions are not ipso facto relational 
properties, and that there could be relational primitivist views on sound.  
 
4  Which properties are sounds? 
 
I will now narrow down what I think are the most plausible views of sound. I shall argue that 
sounds are probably appearance dispositional, appearance relational, or primitive. Call this 
disjunction, ‘AAP.’ Call non-AAP property views in my taxonomy ‘Physical’ property views 
(with a capital ‘P’), where this means physical in a narrow sense (physical in the sense that 
the properties are like those talked about in physics or composed of those properties). One 
should not take this talk of ‘the Physical’ to suggest anything interesting about which 
properties in my taxonomy are physical (I cannot here provide a definition of ‘physical,’ as 
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that is a hotly debated topic, Stoljar 2015). My argument for AAP views is that they are 
probably the only views that can accommodate the following intuitive proposition:  
Unity.  Sounds essentially stand to each other in relations of similarity and difference. 
(For example, essentially, some high-pitched sound H1 is more similar to some other 
similarly high-pitched sound H2 than to some low-pitched sound L1.) 
 
I shall argue that sounds are probably AAP by (a) showing that appearance dispositionalism, 
appearance relationalism, and primitivism can all accommodate Unity, and then by (b) 
arguing that Physical views on sound probably cannot accommodate Unity. This argument 
mirrors arguments from unity in the color literature (Pautz 2003, 2006). (I will not argue for 
Unity further, as its cousin in the color literature is generally accepted as an intuitive 
principle that any view must at least say something about, Pautz 2003, 2006.)  
Sounds might be primitive, because primitivism can accommodate Unity. I have 
already explained the distinction between the intrinsic nature of a property and an essential 
property of that property. Using this distinction, the primitivist can say that due to the 
intrinsic nature of sounds as given in auditory phenomenal experience, sounds essentially 
have second-order properties of standing to each other in relations of similarity and 
difference. So, the primitivist can say that essentially, a high-pitched sound H1 is more 
similar to a high-pitched sound H2 than to a low-pitched sound L1. This answer may not 
satisfy the desire for a reductive explanation, but it shows what I need to show for this part of 
my argument. Sounds might be appearance relational. Such a view can accommodate Unity, 
because the relata of the properties the view says are identical with sounds include sound 
appearances. So, the appearance relationalist can say that essentially, H1 is more similar to 
H2 than to L1 in that the appearance of a H1, which is in some logical sense part of H1, is 
more similar to the appearance of H2, which is in this sense part of H2, than to the 
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appearance of L1, which is in the relevant sense part of L1. The same goes mutatis mutandis 
for the appearance dispositionalist view of sound. Thus, sounds might be appearance 
dispositional, appearance relational, or primitive (AAP). This completes part (a) of my 
argument for the time being. I will come back to it again briefly at the end of the article. 
Part (b) will require more effort. The property theorist will hold that pitch, timbre, and 
loudness are second-order properties of sound properties. So, a Physical view needs to 
account for the similarity and difference relations that the sounds essentially stand in to each 
other using these second-order properties of sounds. (A Physical non-property view needs to 
account for the similarity and difference relations using Physical properties of events or 
waves, so much of the below applies mutatis mutandis to such views.) For simplicity, I will 
concentrate on pitch. As Physical views hold that sounds are Physical properties, such views 
must account for pitch using second-order Physical properties. Periodicity is the best-known 
Physical predictor of pitch (Schnupp, Nelkan, and King 2011).13 So, for the sake of argument, 
I shall assume that periodicity can be said to be a second-order property of non-disjunctive 
Physical properties. It makes no sense to ascribe periodicity to a disjunctive property. The 
disjunctive Physical theorist will have to account for Unity using the periodicity of disjuncts. 
Hence, if non-disjunctive Physical views cannot account for Unity using periodicity, then the 
prospects of a disjunctive Physical theory being able to do so are poor indeed.  
 If the Physical theorist is to account for Unity using periodicity, it must be the case 
that essentially H1 is more similar to H2 than to L1 with respect to periodicity. As I said, 
periodicity is our best-known Physical predictor of pitch, and it is certainly a good predictor. 
However, as I shall soon show, the predictive power of periodicity is imperfect: physical 
properties with the same periodicity can appear to have different pitches. Thus, there is no 
																																																								13A sound composed of consecutive repetitions of one short segment is called ‘periodic.’ The duration of the 
repeated segment is the sound’s period. Periodicity is normally quantified by fundamental frequency (which I 
will explain soon) (Schnupp, Nelkan, and King 2011, Ch. 3).	
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guarantee that Physical properties that match in periodicity are going to match in pitch. This 
is a serious problem for using periodicity to account for Unity. The reason is that there is 
nothing stopping L1 and H2 from having the same periodicity. Thus, just as physical views 
on color like reflectance dispositionalism (Byrne and Hilbert 2003) have a difficult time 
accounting for the color version of what I call ‘Unity’ (Pautz 2003, 2006) (also called ‘Unity’ 
in the color literature), Physical views on sound are going to have a difficult time accounting 
for sound Unity. 
 I will now investigate the predictive power of periodicity and conclude by showing 
that Physical properties with the same periodicity can appear to have different pitches. As 
much of the following comes from Schnupp, Nelkan, and King (2011, Ch. 3), I will, so as not 
to depart too far from the source neuroscience text, speak of periodicity as a property of 
sounds. However, as a Physical theorist, this should be taken to mean a property of whatever 
Physical properties sounds are. Periodicity is quantified by fundamental frequency (F0). This 
is the number of times that the period repeats in one second (F0 = 1/T). So, if the period is one 
ms (1/1000s), the F0 is 1,000 Hz. As a rule, the pitch a sound appears to have corresponds to 
its F0. This rule is often exaggerated as being a law. For example, O’Callaghan (2007) says, 
‘A given pitch includes all sounds, simple and complex, that share a fundamental frequency’ 
(p. 80). This is questionable. There are important deviations from the rule that are a problem 
for the Physical theorist. It is as Schnupp, Nelkan, and King (2011, 96) say,  
‘As we will see again and again, every statement about the relationships between a 
physical characteristic of sounds and the associated perceptual quality will have many 
cautionary notes attached (often in “fine print”).’  
 
 I shall now look at the deviations from the rule that the pitch a sound appears to have 
corresponds to its F0. The first is that periodic sounds appear to have a pitch as predicted by 
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their F0 only if their periods are between about 25ms (an F0 of 40 Hz) and about 0.25ms (an 
F0 of 4,000 Hz). If the F0 of a sound is less than 40 Hz, then either the sound will be 
perceived as a flutter or perceived to have a pitch at a value that is different from that 
predicted for a sound with its F0 according to the rule. If the F0 is greater then 4,000 Hz, the 
perception of pitch may not occur at all. The ability to differentiate between sounds with 
different F0 values declines rapidly the shorter the period after passing the 0.25ms mark.  
 The second deviation from the rule involves complex sounds (sounds composed of 
more than one frequency). The F0 of a complex sound is the greatest whole number factor of 
the sound’s composing frequencies (O’Callaghan 2007, 79). So, the F0 of a sound composed 
of 1,000 Hz, 3,000 Hz, 5,000 Hz, and 7,000 Hz is 1,000 Hz. There are many cases where a 
complex sound’s F0 predicts the pitch it appears to have. However, even when a complex 
sound’s F0 is between 40 Hz and 4000 Hz it is not guaranteed to follow the rule in question. 
For example, a sound composed of 2,100 Hz, 2,200 Hz, and 2,300 Hz has an F0 of 100 Hz, 
but the pitch it appears to have is not the same as that which the rule predicts. Instead, it 
appears to have a pitch that the rule would predict for a sound with an F0 of 2,200 Hz. There 
are many exceptions to the rule for high-order composite frequencies of limited complexity. 
In fact, psychoacousticians say that the rule only applies in what they call ‘existence regions.’ 
These are complex empirically constructed lists of periodicity and Hz numbers under which 
the rule applies (Plack and Oxenham 2005).  
 The issue with the rule that the pitch a sound appears to have corresponds to its F0 is 
twofold: first periodic sounds appear to have a pitch as predicted by their F0 only if their 
periods are between about 25ms (an F0 of 40 Hz) and about 0.25ms (an F0 of 4,000 Hz); 
second, there are a lot of exceptions to the rule for high-order composite frequencies of 
limited complexity. Thus, it is not always going to be the case that essentially some sound H1 
is more similar to some sound H2 than some other sound L1 with respect to periodicity. H2 
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and L1 could have the same period. Thus, the Physical theorist cannot accommodate Unity 
using periodicity. Periodicity is the best-known Physical predictor of pitch. Thus, if 
periodicity does not allow the Physical theorist to account for Unity, then the Physical 
theorist is in serious trouble. Perhaps future discoveries in psychoacoustics will uncover a 
Physical property that corresponds with pitch. Even if a Physical correlate of pitch is 
discovered, the Physical theorist may still be unable to accommodate Unity. I chose to 
examine pitch, because the rule that the pitch a sound appears to have corresponds to F0 is 
exaggerated. However, timbre (tone quality) is another feature of sounds. Timbre is the 
quality that can differ for a single note played at the same volume on different instruments. 
Finding an underlying Physical correlate of timbre has been difficult. In fact, Handel (1995, 
441) has said that ‘no known acoustic invariants can be said to underlie timbre.’ Thus, we can 
conclude that probably AAP theories are true and Physical theories false.  
 I will now consider three objections to my argument of this Section. I will not 
consider an extended list of objections, as doing so would be redundant with the color 
literature. The purpose of Section 4 is not to convince those who are unconvinced by the 
argument from Unity in the color literature. The purpose is to show that an influential and 
strong argument used against Physical views of color can be applied mutatis mutandis to 
Physical views on sound. I have shown via an investigation of psychoacoustics that the rule 
that the pitch a sound appears to have corresponds to its F0 is just that, a rule, and it is a rule 
with notable exceptions. Periodicity is the best-known Physical predictor of pitch. So, if 
periodicity does not permit the Physicalist to account for Unity, then Physical theories are in 
trouble.  
I shall now consider the three objections. First, my opponent may suggest that one 
hears falsidically in cases where the rule that the pitch a sound appears to have corresponds to 
F0 is broken. In reply, it is unclear whether there are any independent reasons for holding this. 
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The rule can be broken in what seems to be normal circumstances for normal observers. To 
break the rule one need not alter one’s usual environment or one’s ears, or otherwise make 
any changes to one’s person. All one needs to do to break the rule is to produce a complex 
sound of the appropriate type. It is true that the rule is most often broken for sounds not 
naturally created (Schnupp, Nelkan, and King 2011, Ch. 3). So, my opponent may claim that 
we only auditorily perceive naturally created sounds veridically. This appeal to naturalism 
has a high price. Many of the sounds we listen to on a daily basis are not naturally created. 
Many of the colors that we perceive are not naturally created either, but if one is a naturalist 
about sound, one should be one about color (and perhaps other properties too like tastes and 
smells). The same considerations apply in the case of color: colors produced unnaturally 
often do not have natural reflectance profiles, and metamerism is more frequent (for example, 
with car paints). If naturalism is true for perceptible properties, many experiences we take to 
be veridical are really illusions: the sounds and colors from one’s TV are illusions, cars do 
not have the colors they seem to, stoplights are not really red, and so on.  
 Second, my opponent may attempt to accommodate Unity by appealing to appearance 
dispositions, appearance relational properties, or primitive properties that supervene on the 
Physical properties. Specifically, the reply is to say that Physical properties can accommodate 
Unity in that properties which supervene on the Physical properties can. The issue with this 
response is that Unity states that the similarity and difference relations are essential to 
sounds, but it does not seem essential to the Physical properties that certain AAP properties 
supervene on them. Indeed, it does not even seem necessary that the AAP properties 
supervene on the Physical properties they do. I can easily conceive of a world in which the 
laws are different. In fact, that the laws of nature are contingent is the dominant position in 
philosophy (Carroll 1994). So, the issue with this reply is that it does not succeed in 
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convincingly accommodating Unity fully. It accounts for the similarity and difference 
relations but not the component of Unity that these relations are essential. 
Third, my opponent may appeal to an analogue of a particularly popular Physicalist 
response in the color literature which says claims about the structure of color space do not 
have the truth conditions that anti-Physicalists think they do (Hilbert 1987, Shoemaker 1991, 
519; Lewis 1997, 330; Mclaughlin 2003, 115). Namely, my opponents may claim that the 
truth conditions for Unity are of the following form: essentially, experiences as of H1 
resemble experiences as of H2 more than experiences as of L1. If correct, there is no need for 
the Physicalist to account for Unity using second-order Physical properties of the Physical 
properties they say sounds are. A lot has been said about this style of argument for color 
(Pautz, 2006). I will just look at the fundamental problem. Many believe that it is the colors, 
not experiences of them, for which Unity is true (Westphal 1987, 125; Hardin 1988, 66; 
Boghossian and Velleman 1991, 95; Pautz 2006; Allen 2009, 205). The reason has to do with 
what is called ‘the transparency of experience’: when we focus on our experiences as of color 
no mental properties are discovered, instead we end up looking straight through them to the 
colors in the external world. The same can be said mutatis mutandis for sounds.14 Thus, the 
truth conditions for Unity would seem as if they must involve the external world.  
The fact that the truth conditions for Unity seem as if they must involve the external 
world brings us back to my argument that AAP views can accommodate Unity. Specifically, 
one may worry about whether appearance dispositionalism and appearance relationalism 
really satisfy this element of Unity: ultimately, both of these views satisfy Unity by appealing 
to experiences. In reply, it is true that the views appeal to experiences, but not as things 
																																																								
14It is true that one sometimes has a sensation in one’s ear when hearing a loud sound, but this sensation is not 
itself a sound but a pain of sorts. Similarly, when one looks at a bright light, one has a pain in one’s eyes. So, the 
phenomena described is not unique to sound. There are no experiences of sounds as mental properties internal to 
us that we discover when introspecting. This is sufficient for my argument.  	
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merely had by us. The views in question appeal to experiences as logical parts of the external-
world properties they identify with sounds. Thus, unlike Physicalist views, they can 
accommodate both the essentiality component of Unity and the external world component 
without having to deny veridicality in rule breaking cases. This said, primitivism may have 
an advantage in that it does not define sounds by experiences at all. Primitivism holds that the 
intrinsic natures of sounds are given phenomenally and so that sounds are defined 
ostensively: that is a beep, that is C minor. The things pointed to are not normally supposed 
to be internal experiences or composed of experiences but primitive properties of the external 
world. A view on sound that appeals to experiences to accommodate Unity is not a strongly 
objective view. So, primitivism is the only view that has a chance of accommodating Unity 
and being strongly objective. Thus, primitivism ought to be seriously considered.  
 
Summary 
There has been very little recently published on the property view of sound. In this article, I 
first argued that sounds are properties and defended this theory from the various arguments 
against it that make use of salient disanalogies between sounds and colors (Section 2). Next, I 
provided a taxonomy of property views on sound. My taxonomy articulated many views and 
how they are related to one another (Section 3). Finally, I argued that what I called ‘Physical’ 
views (views that hold that sounds are physical properties in the narrow sense) are probably 
incapable of accommodating the similarity and difference relations in which sounds 
essentially stand, what I called ‘Unity’ (Section 4). I have shown that sounds are probably 
properties that are not physical in a narrow sense of the term.  
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